Written by Don Byrd
Orders that a Marine corporal remove signs containing a biblical quotation she posted around her desk did not violate her religious freedom rights under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) because she failed to demonstrate that the orders amounted to a “substantial burden” on her religious exercise, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ruled in a decision handed down yesterday.
Monifa Sterling raised the RFRA defense in a court-martial proceeding over her refusal to obey the order to remove the signs. In rejecting her defense, the Appeals Court emphasized that not every impediment to “religiously motivated action constitutes a substantial burden.”
Here is an excerpt from the opinion (citations removed):
In this case, Appellant did not present any testimony that the signs were important to her exercise of religion, or that removing the signs would either prevent her “‘from engaging in conduct [her] religion requires,’” or cause her to “abandon[] one of the precepts of her religion.” While Appellant testified that posting the signs was religiously motivated in part, she did not testify that she believed it is any tenet or practice of her faith to display signs at work. Nor does Appellant’s testimony indicate how complying with the order to remove the signs pressured her to either change or abandon her beliefs or forced her to act contrary to her religious beliefs. Although Appellant did not have to provide evidence that posting signs in her shared workspace was central to her belief system, she did have to provide evidence indicating an honest belief that “the practice [was] important to [her] free exercise of religion.” Contrary to Appellant’s assertions before this Court, the trial evidence does not even begin to establish how the orders to take down the signs interfered with any precept of her religion let alone forced her to choose between a practice or principle important to her faith and disciplinary action.
The court also highlighted the fact that Sterling did not explain the religious significance of the signs or seek a religious accommodation from the order until her trial. As the court reasoned, “[p]ermitting…military members to disobey orders now and explain why later (much later, as in mid-trial in the instant case) makes no sense.”
The majority opinion expressed skepticism that Sterling even demonstrated that her refusal to follow orders was based on a sincerely held religious belief, but because of the clear failure (in the court’s view) to reach the “substantial burden” threshold, they did not need to resolve the question of her sincerity.
Regardless of whether this is the correct outcome in this particular case, this opinion seems notable for a couple of reasons.
First, it offers a strong defense of the idea that not all burdens are substantial, and that it is not enough for a RFRA claimant to assert that their religious exercise has been substantially burdened, but must demonstrate that the conduct in question is in fact important to their exercise of religion. As the court noted, “[a] substantial burden is not measured only by the secular costs that government action imposes; the claimant must also establish that she believes there are religious costs as well, and this should be clear from the record.”
Second, the case serves as a helpful reminder that when properly applied, RFRA provides a legal framework for courts to apply in evaluating certain claims; it does not predetermine the outcome of that judicial analysis. The lesson here is decidedly not that military orders trump religious exercise, or that military personnel are not allowed to post religious messages in their work spaces. Here, a different set of facts surrounding the signs at issue, or a more thorough articulation of the religious exercise at stake in posting the signs, may have led the court to a different conclusion.
According to a Stars and Stripes report, Sterling’s defense team plans to appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court. Stay tuned.
